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RECENT CASES
Conflict of Laws-)ivorce- Minimum Contacts Doctrine
Extended to Non-Resident in Alimony Award
Petitioner and his wife maintained their matrimonial domicile for
eighteen years in California before they separated and petitioner moved
to Nevada. The petitioner commenced an action for divorce in Nevada,
and within a month his wife tiled a similar suit in California on the
grounds of cruelty. Personal service of process was made upon the
defendant husband at his residence in Nevada pursuant to a California
statute authorizing extraterritorial personal service where the defendant
was a resident of that state when the cause of action arose.' The husband
did not appear, and the California court awarded the wife an
interlocutory judgment of divorce, certain property in California, and
$300.00 per month alimony. She then sued on the California decree in
Nevada where the trial court granted her motion for partial summary
judgment on the issues of property and alimony on the ground that the
California judgement was entitled to full faith and credit.2 On appeal to
the Supreme Court of Nevada, held, affirmed. Where a statute of the
forum state authorizes extraterritorial personal service of process over a
non-resident, and where there exist sufficient contacts between the
defendant and the forum relevant to the cause of action to satisfy due
process, an in personam judgment in a divorce action based on the
extraterritorial personal service is entitled to full faith and credit?
Mizner v. Mizner, 439 P.2d 679 (Nev. 1968).
I. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 417 (Supp. 1967). "Where jurisdiction is acquired over a person
who is outside of this State by publication of summons in accordance with Sections 412 and 413
[personal service out of state], the court shall have the power to render a personal judgment against
such person only if he was personally served with a copy of the summons and complaint, and was a
resident of this State (a) at the time of the commencement of the action, or (b) at the time that the
cause ofaction arose, or (c) at the time of service."
2. Petitioner's attack was directed solely at the validity of that part of the judgment awarding
alimony, contending that the California court was without jurisdiction to enter an in personam
judgment based on extraterritorial personal service of process. 439 P.2d at 680.
3. It is settled that the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution requires that a judgment
of a state which had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter in suit shall be given the same
validity in the courts of every other state which it has in the state where it was rendered. Roche v.
McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928). See Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause:
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 44 COLUI. L. REV. 330 (1944); Sumner, Full Faith and Cre'dit
Jor Judicial Proceedings, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 441 (1955); 107 U. PA. L. REV. 261 (1958). Thus, the
only real issue in this case is whether the California court had jurisdiction to render the in personam
judgment against the defendant.
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In Williams v. North Carolina' the Supreme Court of the United
States held that full faith and credit must be given divorce decrees when
one of the parties was domiciled in the state where the decree was
granted. On a second appeal after retrial, the Court ruled in Williams IP
that a state requested to recognize a foreign divorce decree may decide
for itself whether one of the spouses was domiciled in the foreign state,
and may refuse recognition if it finds he was not. 6 But the Williams cases
dealt only with the termination of the marital relationship and did not
consider the personal jurisdiction necessary to decide questions of
alimony, property rights, and child custody.' In May v. Anderson" the
Supreme Court ruled that Ohio was not required to give full faith and
credit to a Wisconsin award of child custody, since the mother was not
personally served with process within the territory of the forum state.
The Court relied on Pennoyer v. NeJ]], which established the rule that a
court may take personal jurisdiction over a defendant only if process was
served upon him personally within the forum state. The Pennoyer rule
has been substantially modified, however, and nondomiciliaries of the
forum state who are not served personally within its boundaries may
now be subjected to the personal jurisdiction of that state without
offending the requirements of substantive or procedural due process.,' In
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington" the Court held that due process
requires only that a defendant who is absent from the territory of the
forum not be subjected to in personam jurisdiction unless he has certain
minimum contacts with it such that the procedure does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 12 Although the
Supreme Court has never extended the minimum contacts doctrine to
matrimonial support cases, California has enacted a statute to support
personal jurisdiction over an absent defendant personally served outside
4. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
5. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
6. "All the world is not party to a divorce proceeding. What is true is that all the world need
not be present before a court granting the decree and yet it must be respected by the other forty-seven
States provided-and it is a big proviso-the conditions for the exercise of power by the divorcedecreeing court are validly established whenever the judgment is elsewhere called into question." Id.
at 232.
7. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § I1.2 at 287 (1968).
8. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
9. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
10. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945).
II. 326 U.S. 3l0 (1945).
12. fd. at 316.
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the state, if he was a domiciliary of California at the time the cause of
action arose,' 3 and has interpreted this statute to include divorce
proceedings. In the California divorce proceeding of Soule v. Soule, 4 a
husband and wife lived together in California before the husband moved
permanently to Montana prior to the commencement of the suit. He was
personally served with process in Montana but did not appear, and the
wife was granted an interlocutory judgment of divorce and alimony. The
husband then appeared specially in an attempt to have the alimony
provision set aside, but the California Supreme Court upheld the
award.' 5 Prior to the instant case, however, no state has granted full faith
and credit to an alimony award where a non-resident defendant neither
appeared in the case nor was personally served within the territory of the
forum. But where it is determined that the forum state has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant to render such an award, it is clear that
the judgment is entitled to full faith and credit. 6
In the instant case the court concluded that the minimum contacts
concept of in personam jurisdiction is peculiarly suited to matrimonial
support cases, since the state of matrimonial domicile "has a deep
interest in its citizens and a legitimate purpose in taking steps to preclude
their impoverishment."' 7 The court found that the demands of due
process were met in this case, since the extraterritorial personal service of
process was authorized by a statute of the forum state, and there existed
contacts between the defendant and the forum which were relevant to the
cause of action and sufficient to satisfy the "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."'1' [he court distinguished the Supreme
Court's ruling in May v. Anderson on the grounds that there was no
statute in Wisconsin authorizing the extraterritorial personal service for
child custody cases, nor was there any consideration in that case of
whether jurisdiction could be based on the defendant's past contacts with
the forum state. The court noted that the procedure here was calculated
to give adequate notice to the defendant, and the majority concluded that
it was only reasonable to require a defendant to litigate his responsibility
for his conduct at the place where it occurred. Since the defendant was
domiciled in California when the activities which provided grounds for a
divorce occurred, the court decided that California could subject the
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See note I supra.
193 Cal. App. 2d 208, 14 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1961).
Id.
Seenote3 supra.
439 P.2d at 681.
Id.
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defendant to its personal jurisdiction. Finally the court concluded that
since the California court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant,
its judgment carried the presumption of validity and was entitled to full
faith and credit.' 9
The instant court has taken a significant step in the seardh for
fundamental fairness in divorce litigation. The extension of International
Shoe to matrimonial support is significant for two reasons. First, the
court has entered an area of family law in great need of liberalization of

the jurisdictional requirements in the interest of fairness; and second, the
court has supplied a new example of the extension of the minimum

contacts basis for personal jurisdiction. The decision is correct in finding
that matrimonial support cases are particularly suited for the minimum

contacts doctrine. Where a husband and wife have maintained their
domicile in one state up to the time that a cause of action arose, it is only

fair that litigation over economic maintenance and child custody be held
to be within the jurisdiction of that state. The plaintiff in an action for
divorce should not be required to follow the defendant from state to state
in order to obtain an award of alimony or child custody when the dispute
could be equitably settled in the home state. Due process is concerned
with reasonable notice and fundamental fairness, and where these goals
can be achieved in the state-of the matrimonial domicile, it seems only
logical that the courts should encourage the parties to litigate in that
state. It should be remembered that in such cases a court must decide
whether the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
to be subjected to the personal jurisdiction of that state, and that every
foreign state which is then asked to grant full faith and credit to the
judgment may decide for itself the sufficiency of those contacts.2" A
similar step was taken with respect to divorce decrees in the Williams
cases,-" and now it is time to liberalize as well the jurisdictional
requirements for alimony and child custody while maintaining the due
process safeguards of the minimum contacts doctrine. Other states are
19. Two dissenting opinions argued that Nevada was not bound to give full faith and credit to
the California judgment. Justice Collins distinguished the instant case from earlier cases that have
followed the minimum contacts concept on the ground that domestic support cases involve

continuing liability, whereas contract or personal injury actions involve only a single judgment
which is ended when satisfied. Both Justice Collins and Justice Batjer felt that May v. Anderson
precluded the extension of full faith and credit in this case. 439 P.2d 679, 682-86. See Lynde v,
Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901).
20. Since minimum contacts are essential to personal jurisdiction over a non-resident not

served within the state, the question of jurisdiction may be litigated again in a foreign forum
whenever the judgment is questioned. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); note 3
supra.
21. See text accompanying notes 4-7 supra.
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taking steps to enact legislation similar to the California law employed
in the instant case, and it is hoped that the Supreme Court will affirm
this application so as to resolve the question of the constitutional
requirement of granting full faith and credit for all the states.

Conflict of Laws-Torts-Law of Forum Applies to Accident
Involving Only Out-of-State Motorists
While in Wisconsin on a trip which began and was to end in Illinois,
defendant driver negligently injured plaintiff guest passengers. The
parties were all residents of Illinois; the car was maintained, garaged,
and insured in that state. In an action brought in Wisconsin, plaintiffs
demurred to defendant's plea, based on an Illinois statute,' that he
owed no duty to guest passengers except to refrain from willful or
wanton misconduct. The trial court sustained the demurrer, holding that
the Wisconsin law allowing recovery for ordinary negligence applied. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, held, affirmed. Illinois lacks
sufficient concern with a Wisconsin accident to justify its replacing the
forum's "better rule of law" which protects Wisconsin's legitimate
interests. Conklin v. Horner,38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
Traditionally, the law of the place of the wrong, lex loci delicti,
determined the substantive rights of the parties in a tort action.2 This
choice-of-law rule was historically tied to the "vested rights" theory by
which the right to recover for a foreign tort depended on the law of the
place of the injury. Thus, rights and duties vested in the parties at the
time of the tort and followed them unchanged into whatever jurisdiction
they might go.3 Although this simple, certain rule discouraged forum
shopping, its rigid application failed to consider the social desirability of
the outcome in the individual case.' For these reasons, in the field of
contracts, dissatisfaction with a similar mechanical approach based on
22. See 16 DE PAUL L. REV. 45 (1966); 13 U.

KAN.

L.

REV.

554 (1964).

I. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 , § 9-201 (Smith-Hurd 1957).
2. "If a cause of action in tort.is created at the place of wrong, a cause of action will be
recognized in other states. If no cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort

can be had in any other state."

RESTATEMENT

OF CONFLICTS

OF LAWS

§ 384 (1934).

3. See, e.g., Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.,
224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918); Bain v. Northern Pac. Ry., 120 Wis. 412, 98 N.W. 241 (1904);

(3d ed. 1963).
4. See Cavers, A Critiueof the Choice-of-Law Problems, 47 HARV. L. REv. 173 (1933);
Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 949 (1952).

STUMBERG, PRIN IPLES OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS
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the "vested rights" theory led the courts to adopt a "center of gravity,"
or "grouping of contacts," doctrine according to which the court would
apply the law of the state which had the most significant contact with the
matter in dispute.' In tort cases, however, the courts were slower to
deviate from the familiar rule and merely mitigated its harshness by
creating exceptions on a case by case basis.' Finally, in the landmark
case of Babcock v. Jackson, the New York Court of Appeals openly
repudiated the lex loci delicti choice of law rule.' Although speaking in
terms of relative contacts, the court went beyond the "center of gravity"
approach of contracts to hold that the law of the jurisdiction having the
greatest concern or interest with each specific issue raised in the
litigation will have controlling effect on that issue." The Supreme Court
5. E.g., Jansson v. Swedish Amer. Line, 185 F.2d 212 (Ist Cir. 1950); Kievit v. Loyal
Protective Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475, 170 A.2d 22 (1961); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124
N.E.2d 99 (1954); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 332b (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1956). But cj UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105.
6. See, e.g., Dale System, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 527 (D. Conn. 1953); Gorden v.
Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949); Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953);
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961);
Haumschild v. Continental Gas Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959); Paulsen & Sovern,
"'PublicPolicy" in the Conflicts oJ Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956). Several jurisdictions still
find this traditional rule controlling. E.g., Gorenson v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 345 F.2d 750 (6th Cir.
1965); Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594
(Del. 1965); McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965); White v. King, 244 Md. 348,
223 A.2d 763 (1966); Cherokee Lab., Inc. v. Rogers, 398 P.2d 520 (Okla. 1965); Marmon v.
Mustang Aviation, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
7. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S. 743 (1963). Miss Babcock, a passenger in Mr.
Jackson's car, was injured in an accident in Ontario, a jurisdiction which had an automobile guest
statute. All the parties were residents of New York, the car was maintained and insured in New
York, and.the trip began and was to end in that state. New York allowed the passengers recovery on
proof of ordinary negligence. An earlier Minnesota decision, Schmidt v. Discoll Hotel, 249 Minn.
376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957), had refused to follow the traditional rule although it did not repudiate
it.
8. To determine this, a court balances the interests or concerns of the competing jurisdictions.
The line between the "center of gravity" approach and the "interests" approach is fine. The "center
of gravity" relates to the number and weight of the contacts that an event has with a particular
jurisdiction; the "interests" are the manner in which the event would affect that jurisdiction. For
example, the domicile of a party is a "contact," but the effect of a judgment upon his solvency is an
"interest," because his state has a valid concern in preventing pauperism and bankruptcies; the place
of the wrong has a "contact," while the state in which the tort was committed has an "interest" in
preventing wrongful conduct within its borders. Understandably, the courts have not always
distinguished between these approaches. E.g., Dym v. Gorden, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792
(1965); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965). Furthermore, other courts have

adopted the language of RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS

§ 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9,

1964) (the "contacts" approach) while in fact using the "interests" approach. E.g., Wessling v.
Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Casey v. Mason Const. & Eng'r Co., 428 P.2d 898 (Ore. 1967);
see Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflict Laws of Torts, 28 LAW &
CONITEMP. PROB.

700 (1963).
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of California in Reich v. Purcel9 clarified the methodology of the
"interest" approach for determining which law should govern a
particular issue:' understanding that it is applying its own law and not
enforcing foreign rights," a court should consider all foreign and
domestic elements and interests involved and then seek to choose the law
for each issue which would tend to reflect the policies of the jurisdictions
which have legitimate concern.' 2 In 1965, Wisconsin abandoned the lex
loci delicti rule'" and then proceeded in two subsequent decisions'4 to base
its conclusions, whatever the conflicts-of-law problem, solely on the
following guidelines: (1) predictability of results; (2) maintenance of
interstate order; (3) simplification of judicial task; (4) advancement of
the forum's governmental interest; and (5) the "better rule of law".' 5 The
Wisconsin courts consider these guides for each case, but attach relative
importance to each criterion according to the precise issue involved.
In the instant case, the court examined the policies behind
Wisconsin's allowing recovery in a host-guest situation and concluded
that they were as follows: (1) to provide compensation for the injured; (2)
to place the cost of the injury on the wrongdoer who caused the harm;
and (3) to deter negligent conduct. The court then determined that
9. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
10. The confusion following Babcock can be seen in Dym v. Gorden, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209
N.E.2d 792 (1965), where the majority of the New York Court of Appeals failed to examine how
policies behind the different jurisdictions' laws would be affected by its decision before it determined
which rule of law to follow.
II. See Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). The law of the forum
includes its rules for conflicts of laws. Subject only to the limitations of due process and full faith
and credit, the court may apply whichever law seems appropriate. See Leflar, ConstitutionalLimits
on FreeChoice ofLaw, 28 LAW & COMTEMP. PROB. 706 (1963); cf Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S.
397 (1930).
12. The court, finding that only one state had substantial interest in applying its law, gave no
rule when several jurisdictions with varying legitimate policies have considerable interest.
Presumably, the court would have to determine which state had the "predominant interest."
13. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 35 Wis. 2d 98,56 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
14. Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968); Heath v.
Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967); In Zelinger. defendant, a Wisconsin resident,
negligently injured plaintiff's wife and daughter, Illinois residents, in an automobile accident in
Wisconsin. Although not a passenger in the car, plaintiff sued to recover for medical expenses and
the loss of aid, comfort, and society of his wife and daughter. The court allowed defendant's
counterclaim for contribution, against plaintiff's wife even though interspousal immunity existed in
Illinois. Following the guidelines set out in Heath, the court concluded that considerations
concerning predictability, maintenance of interstate order, and judicial simplicity were minimal, but
that the forum had a legitimate interest in spreading risk in tort and placing liability on a moral
basis. It also thought that the Wisconsin policy of denying interspousal immunity was the "better
rule of law."
15. Accord, Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); see Leflar, Choice
Influencing Considerationsin Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 267 (1966).
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application of the Illinois statute, with its policy of protecting the host,
would in effect undermine the deterrent effect of Wisconsin's negligence
laws by sanctioning wrongful conduct on the latter's highways. The
court then decided between these competing interests using its five
conflicts of law guidelines. It dismissed, as minimal, concerns with
predictability, maintenance of interstate order, and judicial
simplification by arguing that first, a tort is obviously not preplanned
with reference to state law; second, the choice of neither law would
impede the free flow of persons across the state line, nor provoke
retaliatory conduct by Illinois; 6 and third, the Wisconsin courts can
easily try the case with either rule of law. Noting, however, the number
of accidents involving out-of-state vehicles each year, 7 the Court
determined that the forum had a legitimate interest in applying those
laws which require motorists to refrain from ordinary negligence.
Finally, the court concluded that since Illinois law did not reflect current
socio-economic conditions, Wisconsin had the "better rule of law."
Chief Justice Hallows, dissenting," argued that Illinois had substantially
greater interest in the host-guest issue, because the case involved no
Wisconsin resident. Since the occurrence of the accident in Wisconsin.
was fortuitous, he maintained that consistency with prior decision
required application of Illinois law.' 9 In the opinion of the Chief Justice,
the decision could adversely affect interstate order, since application of
Wisconsin's law to Illinois residents only on the ground that the
Wisconsin court considers its law -to be the "better rule" could well
offend that state. 0 The dissent thus concluded that the majority's
overemphasis on the conderns of the forum would allow it to apply its
own law in any case in which it thought the forum had the "better rule of
law."
Solely on the basis of the five guidelines enumerated above, the
16. The court implied that the Supreme Court of Illinois had deliberately emasculated the
host-guest statute by allowing recovery for less than "willful and wanton misconduct."

17. 4,129 Illinois vehicles were involved in accidents on Wisconsin highways in 1965; 3,655 in
1966.

18.

A month and a half before the instant case the Chief Justice wrote the majority opinion in

Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968), in which a unanimous
court clarified its five guidelines. See note 14 supra.
19. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965). The majority
distinguished

this case on the ground that in the instant case Wisconsin was the forum as well as the place of the
tort.
20.

The dissent indicated that predictability may also have some importance; for example, by

insuring Illinois residents, the insurance company did not anticipate Wisconsin law. See
Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict oJ Laws-Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability
Under "ForseeableandInsurable Laws,' 69 YALE L.J. 595 (1960).
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majority's analysis is sound,2' provided that Wisconsin has sufficient
interest in the issue of liability to justify application of the guidelines at
all. While Wisconsin's interests should control the resolution of issues
dealing with conduct within her borders, the right to recover is directed
towards compensation of the harmed." Since the parties are all Illinois
residents, this is particularly an Illinois concern. Likewise, under the

older "contacts" approach, Illinois is clearly the "center of gravity."23 In
a case such as this, examination of the forum's interests with the

guidelines without- regard to other states' legitimate concerns (except
where the maintenance of interstate order might be affected) permits
application of the rule of lex fori in any tort case in which the value

judgment of the court finds local law more attractive. The guidelines,
thus, enable a judge's subjective choice of "the better rule of law" to be

the deciding factor in a conflict of laws problem. While this may at
times lead to greater justice in the individual case, it does not lead
certainty. The progressive steps away from a mechanical resolution
conflict problems are marked by the creation of exceptions to the rule
lex loci delicti, then the balancing of interests, and in this case,

to
of
of
a

determination of the "better rule of law." Such an approach as that of
these guidelines not only reopens the door to forum shopping,24 but also

creates, greater difficulty in determining what law to apply. It is
submitted that the guideline approach grants the judges excessive
discretion and that the methodology of Reich v. Purcell,while providing

the forum with sufficient protection for its particular interests, would
still promote a measure of certainty and consistency.

21. Professor Leflar, the creator of these guidelines, in a hypothetical with very similar facts,
used the same reasoning to reach the majority's conclusion. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice
Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1593 (1966).
22. The majority also argued that its laws were directed toward deterring negligent conduct.
It is questionable, however, if a driver, except perhaps an occasional lawyer or insurance
underwriter, would vary his conduct upon crossing the state line because Wisconsin allows his guest
recovery, even assuming that he knew of that law. But cf. Kell v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263
N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965), afj'd 26 A. D. 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966).
23. Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 486, 157 N .W.2d 579, 588 (dissenting opinion);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS' OF LAWS § 379 L, comment f at 80 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1964). Wisconsin had only two contacts, the forum and the place of the injury. If the state's only
contact were that of the forum, it could not constitutionally apply -its law. See note I I supra. The
court had previously argued that the place of an automobile accident was "merely fortuitous."
Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 633, 133 N.W.2d 408,416 (1965).
24. While the majority argued that the plaintiffs did not choose Wisconsin as a forum because
of any variatiofin the host-guest law, it conceded that the plaintiffs did engage in forum shopping to
take advantage of Wisconsin's rule permitting direct action against insurance companies.
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Constitutional Law- Desegregation-States Are Required To
Take Affirmative Action To Desegregate
Higher Education Facilities
A Negro teacher and a Negro student' at a predominately Negro
state college in Nashville brought a class action seeking injunctive relief2
to halt construction of the University of Tennessee Nashville Center,' a
predominantly white school, claiming that perpetuation of a dual higher
educational system violated their rights under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment4 and titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 5 Plaintiffs contended that, even though students could
exercise free choice in the selection of a college and attendance was not
compulsory, since racial segregation was begun by operation of law, the
defendants 6 were under an affirmative duty to dismantle the dual
educational system and were perpetuating racial imbalance by
expanding the Nashville Center in the same city in which Tennessee
Agricultural and Industrial State University for Negroes is located.
Defendants responded that the institutions would be complementary,
since the Nashville Center would be devoted primarily to evening
classes.7 Since the two schools are separate institutions' and neither
1. Other plaintiffs included: a white teacher at the University of Tennessee Nashville Center
(hereinafter referred to as Nashville Center); a Negro high school senior as a potential student at
Tennessee Agricultural and Industrial State University for Negroes (hereinafter referred to as A&I)
and his father.
2. Plaintiffs also sought a declaratory judgment that the enabling section for A&I in the
Tennessee Code be declared null and void on its face as violative of the Constitution. This section,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-3206 (1966), provides: "The function of [A&I] shall be to train Negro
students . . . . Negro persons, residents of the state, who are not under sixteen (16) years of age,
may be admitted to the university."
3. Funds were provided by the federal and state governments.
4. Plaintiffs assert that defendants have failed to implement the mandate declaring separate
but equal schools unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
E.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c, 2000d-4 (1964). Title IV defines terms and authorizes aid to schools
attempting to desegregate. Title VI denies federal aid to schools practicing segregation.
6. The Governor; Commissioner of Education; Tennessee State Board of Education;
Tennessee Higher Education Commission and its chairman; the University of Tennessee, its
President, Board of Trustees, and Vice Chairman; A&I, its President, Interim Committee and
members; HEW and Secretary Cohen; OEO and its Commissioner. By court order the action was
dismissed as to federal defendants; the United States then intervened as party plaintiff under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000h2 (1964).
7. The Nashville Center would offer evening degree granting programs in the areas of
engineering, business administration, liberal arts, and education. During the day, the Center would
be used for a Graduate School of Social Work, an Associate of Arts program in nursing, and inservice training of government employees. A&I presently offers daytime courses in business
administration, liberal arts, education, and an unaccreditated engineering school.
8. A&I is administered under the Tennessee State Board of Education, while the University of
Tennessee is a corporation administered by its Board of Trustees.
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denies admission to qualified individuals on the basis of race, 9 defendants
contended that they had no affirmative duty to eradicate the racial

imbalance at the schools.' The court denied the injunction, finding that
expansion of the Nashville Center alone would not perpetuate a dual
system of education;" but in ordering a desegregation plan, held, that
when in institutions which are historically segregated there has been no
genuine progress toward desegregation and no genuine prospect of

progress, the state has an affirmative duty imposed by the Constitution
to dpvise a plan for substantial desegregation of public higher

educational facilities. Sanders v. Ellington, Civil No. 5077 (M.D. Tenn.,
August 21, 1968).
To date, the great majority of desegregation cases have dealt with

primary and secondary public schools. The Supreme Court declared in
1955 in Brown v. Board of Education12 that public school authorities

have the primary responsibility for good faith implementation of
governing constitutional principles. Nearly a decade later, Congress, in

response to the minute progress in the integration of primary and
secondary schools,' 3 enacted titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.'4 Provisions for federal aid to local schools were made dependent

upon non-discriminatory practices, and the United States Attorney
General was empowered to institute desegregation suits. Regulations 5
promulgated by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare were
supplemented by specific guidelines1 6 for the integration of elementary
and secondary schools, 7 including "freedom of choice" plans. One

provision of the HEW guidelines allowed a school system to use a court9. Fifty-seven thousand students attend Tennessee's public universities. About 6,000, or 11%,
of the total are Negroes. In the traditionally white institutions, the percentages of Negro enrollment
range from 0.6% to 7.0%. A&I has a Negro enrollment in excess of 99%.
10. Defendants admitted that the enabling legislation would be unconstitutional if it were being
utilized.
11. The court did not order a halt to the expansion of the Nashville Center, because it found a
need in Nashville for an evening educational unit operated on an integrated basis. The court also
found that the schools would not be competing, but rather would complement each other. The court
specifically did not follow the reasoning of Alabama State Teachers Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. School
& College Authority, 289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (discussed in text accompanying
note 24 infra).
12. 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
13. See HousE Comm. ON THE JUDICIARY REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), 2 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2508 (1964).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c, 2000d-2000-4 (1964).
15. 45 C.F.R. § 80.4(a)(1) (1968): "Every application for Federal financial assistance to carry
out a program to which this part applies. . shall. . . contain. . . an assurance that the program
will be conducted. . . in compliance with all requirements imposed by or pursuant to this part."
16. 45C.F.R. § 181 (1968).
17. The present and, in some cases, future HEW guidelines have been adopted as obligatory on

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[VOL. 22

approved integration plan in lieu of the guidelines and still retain federal

aid. 8 However in 1967, in United States v. Jefferson County Board of
Education,'9 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that school
authorities have an affirmative duty to integrate public schools formerly

segregated and that the HEW guidelines constitute the minimum
standard to be applied by the courts in achieving integration. In 1968, in
Green v. County School Boardof New Kent County 0 and its companion
cases, ' the Supreme Court added that "freedom of choice" plans are not

acceptable where in actual operation they have not achieved any
substantial degree of desegregation and that school officials in such
situations must "fashion steps which promise realistically to convert
promptly to a system without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but
just schools.

2

2

Until very recently, litigation in the realm of higher

education was aimed at assuring Negro students the right to attend statesupported colleges and universities which had been maintained
exclusively for white students; the principle had been firmly established
that applicants could not be excluded from such schools on the basis of
race." Shortly before the decision in the instant case, a federal court in

Alabama denied injunctive relief in a similar situation. 4 That court

agreed that the state is under an affirmative duty to dismantle the dual

system on the college level, but ruled that in doing so no more is required
than good faith admission of students and employment of faculty and

staff personnel on a non-discriminatory basis.
In the instant case, the court relied on Green to hold that there is an
affirmative duty imposed upon the state by the fourteenth amendment to

dismantle the dual system of higher education. The court then found that
a substantially segregated higher educational system still existed in
local authorities. See, e.g., Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., Civil No. 15973 (E.D. La.,
Oct. 13, 1965), cited in 11 RACE REL. L. REP. 171 (1966).
18. 45 C.F.R. § 80.4(c) (1968): "The requirements . . . with respect to any elementary or
secondary school or school system shall be deemed to be satisfied if such school or school system
• . .is subject to a final order of a court of the United States ....

19. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 840 (1967), noted in 20 VAND. L. REV. 1336 (1967).
20. 391 U.S. 430 (1968), noted in 21 VAND. L. REV. 1093 (1968).
21. Raney v. Board of'Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S.
450 (1968).
22. 391 U.S. at 442.
23. See, e.g., Lucy v. Adams, 350 U.S. 1 (1955); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
332 U.S. 631 (1948). See also Jamieson v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 3173 (E.D. La.,
May 6, 1965), cited in 10 RACE REL. L. REP. 1004 (1965) (white woman seeking admission to
Negro college).
24. Alabama State Teacher's Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. School & College Authority, 289
F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
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Tennessee" and that the naked fact of an open-door policy is not enough
to satisfy constitutional requirements, since it has not, in this situation,
accomplished desegregation. In directing the defendants to devise a plan
which would effectively eliminate the dual system at the college level, the
court avoided making a detailed stipulation, but asserted generally that
the success of any proposed program must necessarily depend on
"whether it makes the institution attractive to the students who will
' 26
exercise a free choice as to where they attend college.
This case represents a logical extension of the pragmatic approach
announced in Green. The court order is unique, because it is the first to
be issued to an institution of higher education. While primary and
secondary school districts have the alternative of compulsory
geographical zoning laws to eliminate a dual system, the defendants in
the present case must devise a plan to stimulate the free choice of both
Negro and white students. In providing stimulation, however, such a
plan must avoid any consideration of race, for to do so would contravene
the civil right sought to be protected-the right to be admitted without
regard to race. Aside from requiring improvement of the academic
posture of Tennessee A & I to make it competitive with pr~domninantly
white schools, an effective free choice plan could conceivably involve
redevelopment of the area surrounding the school to make it attractive to
white students. Since Negro public universities are in widespread
-existence in the South, the impact of this decision will be primarily
directed at that section of the county. While the opinion could be limited
to the .peculiar situation of Negro public universities, the court did not
emphasize that the situation involved in the present case was formerly
de jure segregation, 7 and treated it as an instance of de facto segregation, because socio-economic factors, rather than the law, are now the
reasons that Tennessee A & I is 99 per cent Negro.28 Consequently, this
25. See note 9 supra.
26. Because of differences between higher education and primary or secondary education, in
that attendance at the college level is neither compulsory nor free, the court concluded that
defendants must be given an extended time to divise a plan for the substantial desegregation of the

state's system of higher education, in particular A&I.
27. Courts have struggled with the distinction between de facto segregation, which exists
primarily due to socio-economic factors, and de jure segregation, which is produced under color of
law. Courts have ruled that the operation of a de facto segregated public school system does not
violate the equal protection clause. Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964). De jure segregation has been struck down. Taylor v. Board of Educ.,
191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961).
28. A clear-cut dejure-de facto distinction is made in Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401
(D.D.C. 1967), wliere the court, faced with an essentially de facto segregation situation,
characterized elements under color of law, such as teacher assignment based partially on the racial
proportions of the schools, as dejbre to order a cessation of such practices.
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case could be authority for the application of the pragmatic approach of
Green to the de facto situation in that a free choice desegregation plan
must work effectively in order to be constitutionally acceptable. There
are, however, de jure elements present in the instant situation.2 9 Courts
that would hesitate to act in the de facto situation could characterize
this, and similar situations, as de jure, since both the origin and
administration of the present system were under color of law." The real
significance of this decision is that for the first time a state has been
required to dismantle a dual higher educational system which formerly
existed by force of law, but now exists due to socio-economic factors.

Constitutional Law-Selective Service Act-Fifth Amendment
Requires Civil Judicial Review of Draft Board Classification and
Induction Orders
Plaintiff was ordered to report for induction pursuant to the
Military Selective Service Act of 1967. Upon learning of a recent
Supreme Court decision' which had a possible bearing on his case,
plaintiff requested renewed consideration of his conscientious objector
claim. His draft board, relying on section 460(b)(3) of the Act, 2 refused
this request, as well as an additional request for appeal. Plaintiff filed a
declaratory judgment action claiming that due process guarantees a
right to civil judicial review of a selective service classification and
induction order by an article III court prior to criminal prosecution.
Thus, plaintiff contended that section 460(b)(3) was an unconstitutional
denial of due process under the fifth amendment as it prohibited such a
29. The court specifically found in the present case, however, that the defendants were not
guilty of any constitutionally impermissible acts and had acted in good faith in the administration
of the "open door" policy.
30. For a similar approach see Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967) (discussed
in note 28 supra).
I. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). This decision formulated a test for a
conscientious objector to military service: such a person must have a sincere and meaningful belief
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by God.
2. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. 1967). This section provides: "No judicial review
shall be made of the classification or processing of any registrant by local boards, appeal boards, or
the President, except as a defense to a criminal prosecution instituted under § 12 of this title. ..
after the registrant has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report for
induction ....
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review except in defense to a criminal prosecution for draft evasion. The
government argued that since section 460(b)(3) provides for judicial
review in a criminal proceeding, the due process requirement is satisfied.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
upheld the constitutionality of the Act.3 Two days later plaintiff refused
to submit to induction, and shortly thereafter the court amended its
opinion and ruled that plaintiff's complaint raised a substantial federal
question. 4 On the government's motion to dismiss, held, denied.' The
denial by section 460(b)(3) of the civil judicial review of selective service
classification and induction orders prior to compliance or criminal
prosecution is unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
The Selective Training and Service Act of 19406 provided that the
decisions of local boards classifying registrants "shall be final." 7 Courts
have interpreted this language as a clear indication of congressional
intent to isolate draft board decisions from judicial review. The broad
issue of right of review was presented first to the Supreme Court in Falbo
v. United States.8 Avoiding the constitutional issue, the Supreme Court
held that Falbo was not entitled to judicial review because he had failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies.' The practical result was that
3. Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
4. The district court thought a determination of the constitutionality of § 460(b)(3) was
appropriate for resolution by a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1964). However,
the three-judge court remanded the case to the original forum, holding that "[A] three-judge court
is not required where the constitutionality of a congressional statute is merely drawn in question and
is required only where an injunction against the statute's enforcement, operation or execution is
sought." Peterson v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 698, 699 (N.D. Cal. 1968). During this time, the district
court approved a stipulation of the parties staying further proceedings in the case. It was believed
by the parties that Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Board No. 1I, 390 F.2d 100 (10th
Cir. 1968), in which certiorari was being sought, would raise the issue of the constitutionality of
§ 460(b)(3). However, both parties learned that the precise question might not be decided by the
Supreme Court. Therefore, on April 3, 1968, the government asked to be released from the stipulation and moved to dismiss.
5. The court stayed proceedings in the nature of an order to show cause why the order
to submit to induction should not be declared invalid and why prosecution for failure to comply
therewith should not be enjoined. Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1968). Clearly,
the court stayed these proceedings in order that the sole issue on alipeal would be the constitutionality of 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. 1967).
6. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885 (now Military Selective
Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. 1967) ).
1 7. 54 Stat. 893. The Military Selective Service Act of 1967 retains similar language: "The
decisions of such local board shall be final, except where an appeal is authorized and is taken in
accordance with such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe." 50 U.S.C.A. App.
§ 460(b)(3) (Supp. 1967).
8. 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
9. Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 553 (1944). The Court reasoned that since the
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many courts refused to interfere with the induction of registrants. 0
Shortly after the end of World War II in the case of Estep v. United

States," the Supreme Court was squarely presented with the issue of a
registrant's right to judicial review prior to induction. The Court
concluded that a draftee who exhausts his administrative remedies and
reports but does not submit to induction may then introduce evidence as
to the impropriety of his classification as a defense to a criminal
prosecution for draft evasion.' 2 Thus, in order to challenge induction, a
draftee was forced to accept induction and raise the issue by habeas

corpus, or to refuse induction and claim procedural irregularities as a
defense to the subsequent criminal prosecution. The Military Training
Act of 1950 3 continued the same basic policies. Despite this general
trend, the Second Circuit, in Wolff v. Selective Service Local Board No.

16,' 4 fashioned a first amendment exception to judicial non-interference
with draft classifications. 5 In that case, although lacking jurisdiction, 6 a
local board had revoked plaintiff's student deferment as a punitive

measure following his participation in a sit-in demonstration on the
premises of a Selective Service office. The court held that such arbitrary
action was a threat to the first amendment right of free speech and, thus,

justified prompt judicial review of the classification without exhaustion
of administrative remedies.

In response to growing concern over this

inductee may be rejected at the induction center, a refusal to appear at the center does not complete
the process. This idea was drawn from the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in administrative law.
See generally Layton & Fine, The Draft and Exhaustion ofAdministrative Remedies, 56 GEo. L.J.
315, 322-28 (1967); Note, Fairnessand Due Processunder the Selective Service System, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 1014, 1016 (1966).
10. E.g., Koch v. United States, 150 F.2d 762 (4th Cir. 1945); Klopp v. United States, 148
F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1945). But see Chih Chung Tung v. United States, 142 F.2d 919 (1st Cir. 1944);
United States v. Peterson, 53 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal. 1944).
11. 327 U.S. 114 (1946). Fstep reported to the induction center, but refused to be inducted.
Therefore, the Court could not avoid the constitutional issue on the grounds that the registrant
failed to exhaust all his administrative remedies. Id. at 123.
12. Mr. Justice Murphy, in a concurring opinion, dealt directly with the problem of judicial
review and administrative law: "Before a person may be punished for violating an administrative
order, due process of law requires that the order be within the authority of the administrative agency
and that it not be issued in such a way as to deprive the person of his constitutional rights." Fstep v.
United States,'327 U.S. 114, 126-27 (1946).
13. Universal Military Training and Service Act, ch. 144, 65 Stat. 75 [1951] (now Military
Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 451 (Supp. 1967)).
14. 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
65. See81 HARV. L. REV. 685, 687 (1968).
16. There should have been no reclassification by the board in Wolff: The prosecution of
persons who "hinder" or "interfere" with the administration of the board shall lie in "any district
court in the United States." 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 462(a) (Supp. 1967). See Note, supra note 9, at

1043-48.
17. Wolff would have been less noteworthy had the court relied exclusively upon the board's
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action, 8 Congress provided in section 460(b)(3) of the Military Selective
Service Act of 1967 that no judicial review be made of a registrant's
draft classification prior to criminal proceedings. 9
While case law and statutory response to judicial, review were
accumulating, the article 11120 powers of Congress to restrict jurisdiction

of the lower federal courts inspired continuing debate. 2 The
controversy centered about the power of Congress to abolish judicial

review of the validity of an administrative order. There is considerable
authority to the effect that Congress is free to restrict judicial power in
this manner, 22 but some doubts have persisted, 23 engendered by dicta in
Yakus v. United States,24 where the Supreme Court approved a method
of appeal by which a party aggrieved by an administrative order could

directly petition the Supreme Court for review. This was the exclusive
means of appeal provided by Congress, and if ignored, was lost even as a
defense to a criminal prosecution. The Court concluded that there is no

constitutional requirement as to which tribunal must hear an appeal, so
long as there is an opportunity for judicial review which satisfies due
process.2" A reading of Yakus suggested that due process imposed some
restriction on congressional power to limit judicial review. The Second
Circuit, in Battaglia v. General Motors,26 has reinforced this reading of
Yakus by holding that congressional power to restrict judicial
jurisdiction is bordered by due process limitations.2 7 An eminent
authority has suggested that if there is any limitation on congressional
lack of jurisdiction for its determination. Rather, the policies in support of the protection of first
amendment rights were used as a basis for decision. For an interesting discussion of Wolff by
plaintiff's counsel, see Layton & Fine, supra note 9.
18. H.R. REP. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 30-31 (1967): "The [House Armed Services]
Committee was disturbed by the apparent inclination of some courts to review the classification
action of local or appeal boards before the registrant had exhausted his administrative decisions."
19. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. 1967).
20. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1: "The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."
21. See WVRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §§ 1, 10 (1963).
22. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943): "The Congressional power to
ordain and establish inferior courts includes the power of 'investing them with jurisdiction either
limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and
character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.'"
23. E.g., Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953).
24. 321 U.S. 414 (1944). The Court held the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 not to be an
unconstitutional delegation to the Price Administrator of the legislative power of Congress to
control commodity prices in time of war. Id. at 423.
25. 321 U.S. 414,444 (1944).
26. 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948).
27. "[W]hile Congress has the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction
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doubts, the court sought analogy in several administrative rate-making
power to restrict jurisdiction of article III courts, Battaglia probably
represents the maximum limit.28
In the instant case, the court acknowledged congressional power to
regulate jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. However, the court
found precedent construing the due process clause of the fifth
amendment as implying a right of judicial review.29 Examining due
process limitations on the elimination of judicial review, the court noted
support for the idea that some review of administrative action which
operates in a coercive manner upon individuals is essential to due
process." If "fundamentals were violated,'"' some judicial review, at
least of the procedural regularity of administrative determinations, is
necessary to protect basic individual rights. Turning to the question of
judicial review in the selective service context, the instant court found
that although review in Estep was limited to criminal cases, the Supreme
Court in that case did not interpret the statutory language involved to
mean that no judicial review was permitted.32 Looking to Mr. Justice
Murphy's concurring opinion in Estep,33 the instant court took the
position that judicial review is required by the Constitution, and thus,
that Congress cannot make selective service induction orders
unreviewable. Having concluded that some review is necessary, the court
examined the constitutionality of section 460(b)(3) in deferring review
until criminal prosecution. Although section 460(b)(3) did provide for
judicial review in a limited sense, the court determined that prohibiting
all civil review prior to criminal prosecution presented serious questions
as to the individual's right to due process. In order to resolve these
of courts other than the Supreme Court, it must not so exercise that power as to deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
... Battaglia v. General Motors, 169 F.2d
254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948).

28. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 10 (1963).
29. 285 F. Supp. 700, 703-05 (N.D. Cal. 1968). See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
(1944); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Battaglia v. General Motors, 169 F.2d 254 (2d
Cir. 1948).
30. 285 F. Supp. at 706. See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38,
52 (1936): "Under our system there is no warrant for the view that the judicial power of a competent court can be circumscribed by any legislative arrangement designed to give effect to administrative action going beyond the limits of constitutional authority." See also American School
of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
31. 285 F. Supp. at 706. See also Bustos-Ovalle v. Landon, 225 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir.
1955) (dictum).
32. See text accompanying note 7 supra for the statutory language applied in Estep. The
requirement that a local board's decision is "final" is retained in the present draft law. See note 7
supra.
33. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 130 (1946): "[J]udicial review of some sort and at
some time is required by the Constitution ....
See also note 12 supra.
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cases 34 and relied heavily on Reisman v. Caplin,35 which held judicial
review provisions constitutional where they allowed a challenge which
did not require a choice between compliance or penalty. Reasoning by
analogy, the court concluded that due process is violated if the challenge
is restricted to these alternatives. Applying this principle to the selective
service situation, the instant court found one of the two alternatives to be
submission to induction followed by a filing for a writ of habeas corpus.
Although the government contended that habeas corpus satisfies due
process, the court noted that this conclusion has been questioned.36 The
court pointed out that submitting to induction is the equivalent of
compliance with the administrative order-alleged to be invalid, and thus
unsatisfactory in meeting the demands of due process. Turning to the
second alternative of submitting to criminal proceedings, the court
recognized the distinct possibility of imprisonment. After weighing the
consequences of section 460 (b)(3) upon the individual, the court held that
due process demands a finding of unconstitutionality of a procedure
which subjects a registrant to a criminal prosecution in order to raise the
defense that his induction notice was invalid due to procedural errors
committed by the local board. After dealing with these two alternatives,
the court considered the strong governmental interest in the raising of
armies. Recognizing the government's contention that civil review would
merely be a "litigious interruption" 37 in the mobilization process, the
court discarded the argument with the prediction that civil adjudication
38
of the validity of induction orders will result in a net saving of time.
The instant court, in dealing with the question of congressional
power to restrict jurisdiction in article III courts, magnifies the
"lingering doubts" as to the extent of congressional authority to grant or
withhold judicial power. Unquestionably, Congress has considerable
discretion in dealing with the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.39
34. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298
U.S. 38 (1936); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196 (1924); Oklahoma Operating
Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331 (1920); Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651 (1915);
Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340 (1913); ExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

35. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
36. See 56 CALIF. L. REv. 448, 460 (1968).
37. 113 CONG. REC. S8052 (1967) (remarks of Senator Russell (D.Ga.)).
38. Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700, 712 (N.D. Cal. 1968): In the words of the court, civil
adjudication will have the following effects: (I) "The need for a few trials will be obviated by
voluntary compliance with orders which have been judicially declared valid," and (2) "some time
will be saved at trial because the issue of the order's validity will not have to be litigated."
39. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 10 (1963). Congress has the power to specify a particular
couit to hear certain questions. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1942). It can prescribe an
exclusive method of judicial review, which if not followed, will prohibit the raising of defenses even
in a criminal action. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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However, the Petersen court has found it necessary to read article I II in
conjunction with the due process requirement of the fifth amendment,
thus limiting congressional power in this area. Significantly, the court
was dealing with a statutory provision which expressly eliminated
administrative decisions from civil review, but provided a method of
review as a defense to criminal prosecution. If Congress had eliminated
all review, the basis for decision would have been much stronger.
However, the court chose to apply its interpretation of article III to the
case at hand in order to determine whether the method of review satisfied
an implicit fifth amendment due process requirement. The effect of this
judicial methodology on past law will be to restrict congressional
elimination of judicial review. Unquestionably, the court treats the
Selective Service Bureau as an administrative agency which provides
necessary manpower for national defense. By specific provision,40
Congress has excluded the Bureau from the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 41 which provides for judicial review. The
basis for this exclusion rested on a congressional value judgment to the
effect that the exigencies of national defense far outweigh an individual's
right to an early contest of procedural irregularities in court. Obviously,
the governmental interest in drafting manpower fluctuates markedly in
direct relation to political crisis both at home and abroad and there is a
strong argument in favor of non-interference with rapid mobilization to
cope with a crisis. It is submitted, however, that it is at just such times of
crisis that the courts should be most watchful of the individual's rights.
In recognizing this basic right, the Petersen decision should have a
dual significance. The induction process will be scrutinized by the courts,
thereby provoking the possibility of an initial slowdown in the drafting
of manpower,42 while extending due process protection in a civil court to
registrants who contest the validity of their induction notices. Of perhaps
greater significance, however, is the question of congressional power to
limit federal court jurisdiction. Once given, such jurisdiction has
produced a large body of law under the due process clause which would
seem to relate back to limit Congress's article III power. Thus, the
reasoning in Petersen could provide analogical precedent for judicial
attack on title II of the Omnibus Crime bill,43 which would appear to be
an attempt to circumvent many recent federal decisions in the area of
procedural due process.
40. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 463(b) (Supp. 1967).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1964).
42. But see note41 supra.

43. Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. 1I (June 6,
1968).
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Public Welfare-Substitute Father Regulation Inconsistent with
Social Security Act and Invalid Criterion for Denying AFDC
Payments to Needy Children
Petitioners, a mother and her four legally fatherless children,' were
removed from.the list of persons eligible to receive financial aid under the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Program established
by the Social Security Act of 1935,2 on the ground that the mother had
sexual relations with a male who was not her husband. Such conduct
disqualified the children under Alabama's "substitute father"
regulation.3 Contending the regulation was inconsistent with the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and with section 406(a)
of the Social Security Act,4 petitioners brought a class action in a federal
district court seeking to enjoin the Alabama Board of Pensions and
Security from enforcing the substitute father regulation. Alabama
defended the regulation as a reasonable means to discourage immorality
and illegitimacy and as consistent with the Social Security Act's policy of
allowing the states to formulate their own guidelines for welfare
eligibility.5 The three-judge district court granted judgment for
petitioners, holding. the substitute father regulation unconstitutional as
an arbitrary and discriminatory classification resulting in the denial of
financial benefits to otherwise eligible children.' On direct appeal tothe
United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, without reaching the
constitutional issue. Denial of federally funded assistance to needy,
legally fatherless children because their mother cohabits with a male who
owes no legal duty of support to the children violates section 406(a) of
the Social Security Act. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
I. Used in this context, the term "legally fatherless child" is one who does not receive support
or care from a father or a person legally obligated to provide support.
2. 49 Stat. 620 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1394 (1964). Applicable sections: 42

U.S.C. §§ 601-09 (1964).
3. Alabama Manual for Administration of Public Assistance Pt. I, ch. I1,
§ VI V (1964).
This regulation sets forth three situations in which needy dependent children, otherwise eligible, are
to be denied financial assistance: when a man who is neither married to the mother nor the father of
the children lives in, or visits in the home for the purpose of cohabitation, or cohabits with the
mother outside the home.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1964). This section describes a "dependent child" as a "needy child
. ..who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of death, continued absence from
the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent." Id.
5. See H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1935); S.REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 36 (1935); see also DEPT. HEALTH, ED. & WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC AssISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION Pt. IV, § 3120.
6. Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Ala. 1967). The trial court based its decision on the

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[VOL. 22

During the first part of this century, public welfare policies were
governed by the "worthy poor" doctrine, which viewed some poor people
as worthy of public assistance and others as unworthy because of moral
unfitness.7 This idea continued to prevail during the depression when
Congress enacted the Social Security Act of 1935, which included the
AFDC program to aid needy children.' The AFDC program is financed
largely by the federal government and administered by the states whose
plans must conform to the Social Security Act and be approved by the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Section 406(a) of the Act
defined the child who was intended to receive aid under the AFDC.
program as a "needy child . . . who has been deprived of parental
support or care by reason of death, absence from the home, or physical
or mental incapacity of a parent." States were permitted to determine a
child's eligibility under the Act;9 conditions not directly related to the
child's financial needs, such as the moral character of the remaining
parent,10 were often considered in determining eligibility. Some state
plans made children not living in "suitable homes" ineligible for
assistance, while others embraced even more restrictive eligibility
requirements by disqualifying illegitimate children and children who
were declared to have a "substitute father." The substitute might meet
neither a common-sense nor a conventional legal definition of "parent,"
but the presumption of his existence could disqualify needy children
from public aid. Despite the inconsistent and sometimes inequitable
administration of AFDC programs, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare failed to move firmly until 1961 when Secretary
Flemming stated that needy children could not be denied assistance on
the basis of unsuitable home conditions while the child remained in the
home." Congress approved the Flemming Ruling by amending the Social
fact that the Alabama substitute father regulation deprived children of equal protection of the laws
in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
7. Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare System. 54 CALIF. L. REv. 326, 327-28
(1966).
Sess. 9-10 (1935), which characterized children as
8. See H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., Ist
"the most tragic victims of the depression;" S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., IstSess., 16-17 (1935),
which declared that the "heart of any program for social security must be the child." It should be
noted that the plight of most children was caused by lack of employment for the family
breadwinner, and Congress intended to solve this problem by providing employment for fathers.
9. See W. BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 29 (1965); see also material cited note 5
supra.
10. Congressional reports and debates indicate that the moral character of the parents could
Sess. 24 (1935); S. RLp.
be considered in determining eligibility. H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., Ist
Sess. 36 (1935).
No. 628, 74th Cong., Ist
II. State Letter No. 452, Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Administration,
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1961): "[A] state plan . . . may not impose an
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Security Act in 1961 and 1962.12 The end result was AFDC assistance to
children placed in foster homes and authorization for states to disqualify
from AFDC children who live in unsuitable homes, provided they are
granted adequate institutional care. Moving further from the idea of
punishing needy children for the acts of their parents, Congress in 1967
amended the Social Security Act to require state plans to provide
3
various rehabilitative programs aimed at improving home conditions.'
Although state-imposed eligibility restrictions have not been judicially
chalienged as inconsistent with the Social Security Act, they have been
overturned on the constitutional ground of denial of equal protection.'"
In the instant case, the Supreme Court held Alabama's substitute
father regulation invalid on the ground that it defined "parent" in a
5
manner inconsistent with section 406(a) of the Social Security Act.' The
Court stated that a child's natural father has a legal duty to support him,
while in Alabama the unrelated substitute father does not,' 6 adding that
it was unreasonable to believe that Congress had intended that a man be
regarded as a "parent" when he was not legally obligated to support the
child. By reviewing other sections of the Social Security Act, the Court
eligibility condition that would deny assistance with respect to a needy child on the basis that the
home conditions in which the child lives are unsuitable, while the child continues to reside in the
home."
12. 75 Stat. 77 (1961), now 42 U.S.C. § 604(6) (1964). The 1962 amendment modified the
1961 amendment by permitting states to disqualify from AFDC aid children who live in unsuitable
homes, provided they are granted other "adequate care and assistance." 76 Stat. 189 (1962), 42
U.S.C. § 604(6) (1964). AFDC assistance was extended to children in foster homes and child-care
institutions. 76 Stat. 180, 185, 193, 196, 207 (1962), 42 U.S.C. § 608 (1964). See also W. BELL,
supra note 9, at 137-51.
13. State plans are required to provide for rehabilitative program of improving and
correcting unsuitable homes, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1964), as aniended, 81 Stat. 877 (1968); to
provide voluntary family planning services for the purpose of reducing illegitimate births, 42
U.S.C. § 602(a) (1964), as amended, 81 Stat. 878 (1968); and to provide a program for establishing
the paternity of illegitimate children and securing support for them, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1964), as
aniended, 81 Stat. 878 (1968).
14. E.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), holding that an illegitimate child is denied
equal protection of the law if prohibited from recovering for the wrongful death of his mother;
Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1967), holding invalid a one-year prior residence
condition for public assistance as being without reasonable relation to purposes of legislation;
Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp 331 (D. Conn. 1967), prob.juris. noted, 389 U.S. 1032 (1968),
holding invalid Connecticut's statute denying aid. to needy persons until one-year residence
requirement is met as violating the privileges and immunities and equal protection clauses; Collins v.
State Bd. of Social Welfare, 248 Iowa 369, 81 N.W.2d 4 (1957), holding invalid a statute
establishing a maximum payment per family regardless of the number of children on the ground
that it fails to include and affect alike all persons of the same class.
15. Under this provision aid can be granted only if "a parent" of the needy child is
continually absent from home. Alabama considered a substitute father to be a non-absent parent.
16. ALA. CODEtit. 34, §§ 89-90 (1958).
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reinforced its interpretation of the term "parent"' 7 and concluded that
the pattern of legislation dictated that a "parent" could only be one who
is under a legal duty to support a child. Rejecting Alabama's contention
that its substitute father regulation was justified because it discouraged
illicit sexual relationships and illegitimate births, the Court stated that
the paramount goal of AFDC is the protection of needy children and
that immorality and illegitimacy should be dealt with through
rehabilitative measures. 8
The immediate effect of the instant decision will be to restore to
eligibility 20,000 persons previously disqualified from Alabama's AFDC
rolls because of the substitute father regulation. An estimated 200,000 to
400,000 persons' 9 in the District of Columbia and the eighteen other

states" which have similar regulations should also have cause for
reinstatement. There is widespread professional opinion supporting the
Court's interpretation as likely to result in more enlightened
administration, based on three principal arguments. First, under this
decision, social workers' time will no longer be consumed attempting to
catch "phantom" fathers, thus releasing workers' energies for more
affirmative efforts in, for example, rehabilitation programs. Second,
AFDC recipients should be able to enjoy more privacy, since they will no
longer be harassed by investigators and "night raiders." Deserted
mothers will be able to have social contacts which might lead to
marriage, whereas previously any casual contact with a member of the
opposite sex was suspect. One study which has been conducted on the
subject indicates that illegitimacy and promiscuity increased when
17. Section 402(a)(10) requires that a state plan must "provide for prompt notice to
appropriate law enforcement officials of the furnishing of aid to families with dependent children in
respect of a child who has been deserted or abandoned by a parent." 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1964).
A 1967 amendment to the Social Security Act requires states to develop programs to establish the
paternity of children born out of wedloczk who are receiving AFDC and to secure support for them,
and to secure support for abandoned children from their parents. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a), as amended,

81 Stat. 878 (1968). States must report to HEW any "parent. . . against whom an order for the
support and maintenance of such dependent child or children has been issued" if payments are not
being made. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1964), as amended, 81 Stat. 896 (1968). Another amendment

requires states to cooperate with HEW in locating any parent against whom a support petition has
been filed in another state. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1964), as amended, 81 Stat. 897 (1968).

18.

The Court ignored the equal protection claim and based its decision entirely upon

statutory interpretation. In his concurring opinion Mr. Justice Douglas came to the same
conclusion by using the equal protection clause.
19. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1968, at 32, col. I.
20. The following states had substitute fathgr regulations in their AFDC plans: Alabama,

Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,

Texas, and Virginia. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. at 337-38.
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welfare payments were withheld, since mothers with no other source of
income were forced to turn to prostitution.2 ' This reasoning suggests that
states interested in combating immorality and illegitimacy should
participate in rehabilitation programs rather than withdraw A FDC
payments. Third, since a major effect of substitute father regulations was
to disqualify many Negroes from financial assistance,22 the instant
decision has eliminated this means of racial discrimination, thus bringing
AFDC administration into closer accord with other major federal
programs.
The AFDC program is being challenged from all quarters. Funds
are an acute problem, especially since the number of those added to
AFDC rolls increased three times as fast in 1967 as it had in most
previous years. 3 Although there is great need for financial assistance for
these children, Congress has continued to give a larger proportion of :
assistance to the aged24 despite the fact that among the poor the young
outnumber the old. 25 Further, payments to the aged are larger than
payments to children.26 The size of assistance to the aged suggests the
political utility of giving aid to those of voting age. 2 The instant case
appears to be only the beginning of an onslaught of suits being filed to
challenge various state AFDC administrative policies in order to
increase, as did the instant case, the number of children eligible. At the
same time Congress has recently limited federal participation in A FDC,
an action popularly termed "the freeze. ' '2 1 As a result both the states and
the needy children are suffering a shortage of funds.
Partly because of the need to provide assistance to more children
from limited funds, and partly because there remain a large number of
adherents to the philosophy underlying the substitute father regulation,
many states may be expected to seek to circumvent the impact of the
instant decision. One technique would be for a state to withdraw from
the AFDC program. However, it is doubtful that any state would take
21. W. BELL, supra note 9, at 182-83, 194-95.
22. Id. at 181-86.
23. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1968, at 38, col. 7.
24. In 1965, aid to the aged and aid to dependant children accounted for 71.2% of public
assistance expenditures. 38.6% of the funds were used for the aged and 32.6% for dependent children.
In the South the respective figures were 65.1% and 18.2%. SOUTHERN REGIONAL COUNCIL, PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE IN THE SOUTH 11 (1966).
25. There are 15 million poor under age 18 in contrast to 1.5 million poor over age 65. B.
WEISBROD, THE ECONOMlCS OF POVERTY I1 (1965).
26. HEW, WELFARE INREVIEW 52, 56 (May-June 1968).
27. SOUTHERN REGIONAL COUNCIL, supra.note24, at 10.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 603(d) (Supp. 1967), as amended, Pub. L. No. 90-364, tit. Ill, § 301 (June
28, 1968). The freeze is discussed in the text accompanying nn. 46-48 infra.
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such a politically drastic step. Another technique which is presently
employed by many states is the maximum grant. The typical maximum

grant provision, whether administrative regulation or state statute,
imposes an arbitrarily-fixed dollar ceiling on assistance payments per

family, regardless of the number of children. -9 Recently, a number of'
suits have been filed challenging maximum grants on the grounds that

they fail to conform to the stated purposes of the Social Security Act and
are in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 0 In the only reported decision challenging the maximum

grant, the Iowa Supreme Court voided that state's maximum grant as
violative of equal protection.'

If that court's well-reasoned opinion is

followed in the pending suits, the future of the maximum grant is short
lived.
Another technique utilized by some states is the awarding of

decreasing amounts for each succeeding child in the family. 2 This has
recently been challenged in the courts. 3 It should be pointed out that the

Court in the instant decision casts doubt on the success of the decreasingamount-per-child suits by a bit of dictum: "There is no question that

States have considerable latitude in allocating their A FDC resources,
since each State is free to set its own standard of need and to determine
the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the program.'" 4
29. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-294 (Supp. 1967): "in no event shall the total amount
of assistance paid . . . to any recipient exceed eighty dollars for any calendar month for a family
containing one dependent child, and twenty-seven dollars for each additional dependent child, but in
no event shall any one familyreceive assistance in excess of two hundred and twenty dollars per
month." Another type of maximum grant appears in a Tennessee statute which provides that any
additional amount established by the state board of public welfare for A FDC payments may not be
in excess of the maximum amounts established by the Social Security Act as the basis for reimbursement from the Federal Government. Tenn. Code Ann. § 14-305 (1955).
30. E.g,, Thomas v. Burson, Civ. No. 2381 (M.D. Ga., filed July 29, 1968); Kaiser v.
Montgomery, Civ. No. 49613 (N.D. Cal., filed July 16, 1968); Blackmon v. Dept. of Pub. Welfare,
Case No. 68-536 (S.D. Fla., filed May 8, 1968); Westberry v. Fisher, Civ. No. 10-80 (D. Me., filed
April 17, 1968); Lindsey v. Smith, Civ. No. 7636 (W.D. Wash., filed April 3, 1968); Robinson v.
Hackney, Civ. No. 68-4-2 (S.D. Tex., filed April 2, 1968); Purvis v. Washington, Civ. No. 722-68
(D.D.C., filed March 21, 1968); Dews v. Henry, Civ. No. 6417 (D. Ariz., filed August 10, 1967).
31. Collins v. State Bd. of Social Welfare, 248 Iowa 369, 81 N.W.2d 4 (1957). However, it
can be argued that Congress approves of family unit maximum grants. 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(I) (1958)
limits the number of children for whom the Federal Government will provide matching grants. 42
U.S.C. § 602 (a)(23) (1968) which requires an increase in state maximum grants to reflect the
rise of living costs is, at least, a concession that maximum grants do exist.
32. E.g., MISS CODE ANN.. § 7173 (Supp. 1966). This statute provides AFDC assistance at
the rate of $25 for the first child, $15 for the second child, and $10 for each subsequent child,
regardless of determined need.
33. Ward v. Winstead, No. 6C 6829 (N.D. Miss., filed July 12, 1968); Purvis v. Washington,
Civ. No. 722-68 (D.D.C., filed March 21, 1968).
34. 392 U.S. at318-19 (1968).
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As long as a state can rationally justify its decreasing budgetary
increment per child by setting its own standard of need as reflecting
economics of scale in child rearing, it seems that the Court will defer to
legislative judgment. 5 However, the equal protection issue would arise if
the same percentage of unmet need, as determined by the state, is not
paid in each of the public assistance categories. This common disparity
used by some states 6 has been challenged on the ground that all poor
should be treated equally, that poor children are entitled to have the
same percentage of their need met as, for example, the aged. It is
apparent from the Court's dictum that states can determine standards of
need as well as benefits to be provided, as long as the standards are
applied uniformly. In a letter spelling out acceptable state responses to
the AFDC freeze, HEW has also approved the meeting of only a
percentage of the state-determined need. The letter suggested that states
either bear the total assistance costs for excess children, or spread
available funds over the entire group by reductions in levels of assistance,
or introduce "reasonable" eligibility restrictions equally applicable to all
within the eligible group.37 In view of these opinions by the Court and
HEW it appears that a percentage reduction plan which gives all classes
of the poor the same, although reduced, percentage of need should be
upheld.
The threshold question of eligibility is a problem wholly different
from and anterior to determining standards of need and levels of benefit.
States are free to use their imagination in formulating eligibility rules as
long as they show due regard to the Constitution and stated purposes of
the Act. In Tennessee, for example, an otherwise eligible child is
prohibited from receiving A F DC assistance if he is between the ages of 6
and 21 and not enrolled in school."' A regulation of this sort appears to
35. Although it is traditional to defer to legislative judgment, there are two cases which
authorize judicial intervention in extreme situations. In striking down Oklahoma's law requiring
sterilization of persons convicted of two or more felonies, the Court recognized that the equal
protection clause required the Court to scrutinize carefully legislation which involves one of the
basic civil rights of man. "Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). In Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.
Supp. 401, 517 (D.D.C. 1967) the court reluctantly entered the political arena "to assist in the
solution [of problems of equal school opportunities for Negroes] where constitutional rights hang in
the balance."
36. E.g., Miss. Code Ann. §§ 7171-73 (Supp. 1966). In Mississippi AFDC children are
allowed 27% of their determined need, while the aged get 100%. Miss. Manual, Vol. III at p. 5701.
In his message on the Welfare of Children, Feb. 8, 1967, President Johnson said, "Thirty-three
states do not even meet their own minimum standards for subsistence." H EW, supra note 26, at 4.
37. Letter from HEW to State Public Welfare Administrators, Jan. 22, 1968.
38. Tenn. Pub. Welfare Manual, Vol. II at 337 (1967). State eligibility requirements are
printed in HEW, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE REPORT No. 50, CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PUBLIC AssisTANCE PLANS UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT (1964).
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be acceptable, since it conforms to the constitutional and statutory
requirements. For states which recognize common law marriages there
appeared at first to be another eligibility device available to circumvent
King v. Smith. A substitute father could be designated a step-father, and
by statute made liable for the upkeep of the children. HEW foresaw this
possibility and has foreclosed it by regulation.39
HEW has responded to King v. Smith by issuing new regulations. 0
In determining whether a child has been deprived of parental support,
the regulations permit only a consideration of the child's natural or
adoptive parent or a step-parent who is ceremonially married to the
child's natural or adoptive parent and is legally obligated to support the
child.' Going beyond the Court's holding on eligibility, HEW addressed
itself to the problem of need by stressing that it shall not be presumed
that a man or other person living in the household who is not legally
obligated to support the persons in the household is providing income.42
States which do not have substitute father restrictions on eligibility are
likely to be affected because of their tendency to assume income from
substitute fathers or stepfathers. Proof of actual contributions is now
necessary. Any state which previously utilized a substitute father
regulation must now give notice of its present policies to former and
potential applicants for A F DC. 43
Congress has not responded to the instant decision, and judging
from a House Ways and Means Committee meeting with Wilbur J.
Cohen, HEW Secretary, no affirmative action is planned.44 If Congress
were to attempt to frustrate the'impact of King v. Smith by legislatively
redefining "needy child" in 406(a) of the Social Security Act so as to
exclude illegitimates, they would, it appears, be guilty of that invidious
class discrimination against illegitimates condemned by the Court last
term in Levy v. Louisiana." Although passage came before the King v.
Smith decision, Congress's AFDC freeze provision deserves mention.
The provision requires a state to determine what proportion of its total
AFDC disbursements were received by persons age eighteen and under
during the first quarter of 1968.46 After June 30, 1968 (now postponed
39.

33 Fed. Reg. 11290 (1968).
WELFARE LAW BULLETIN 19-22 (Sept. 1968).
41. 33 Fed. Reg. § 203.1(a) (1968).
42. Id. at § 203.1(b).
43. Id. at 203.1 (c).
44. Washington Post, July 16, 1968, at A3, col. 3.
45. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
46. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 603(d) (Supp. 1967), as amended, Pub. L. No. 90-364,
tit. III, § 301 (June28, 1968).

40. Id. See 14
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until 1969)"7 the state will not be reimbursed by federal matching funds
for payments to children in excess of this established proportion as
applied to the then existilg population." This imposes a great hardship
on the states which are faced with the normal increase in applicants in
addition to the new eligibles created by the instant decisions. If
maximum grant provisions are quashed, even more funds will be
needed.49 Of course, there is the possibility that the freeze provision will
never become applicable, since it is more likely the result of a power
struggle to cut the budget in exchange for a tax increase than an
indication that Congress has become disaffected with the AFDC
program. Nevertheless, there is an interesting partial solution to the
problem. The amended freeze provision, which delayed the freeze for one
year, retains the original base period. However, under the amendment,
the number of children counted for the base period is increased by the
average monthly number of children eligible for AFDC who receive aid
during the April-June 1969 quarter, and who came on the rolls after
March, 1968, pursuant to a policy which the Secretary determines to
have been effectuated by the state "in compliance with or in reliance
upon or in consideration of a judicial decision." The amendment defines
"judicial decision" as a constitutional decision on the validity of a state
law or rule which denies AFDC assistance because of a man-in-thehouse policy or a durational residence requirement5 0 The instant Court
held that Alabama's substitute father regulation was inconsistent with
the Social Security Act, and, therefore, determined that it was
unnecessary to decide the equal protection issue." However, the
Secretary has characterized the instant Court's resolution of the conflict
between federal and state law as a reliance upon the supremacy clause of
the United States Constitution. The Secretary thus argues that former
"substitute father" states which have revised their regulations
47. Pub. L. No. 90-364, tit. I1l, § 301 (June 28, 1968).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 603(d) (Supp. 1967), as amended, Pub. L. No. 90-364, tit. Ill, § 301 (June
28, 1968). As H.R. 12080, it was debated on the House floor Aug. 16-17, 1967, under a closed rule
which permitted no amendments other than Committee amendments. HEW, WELFARE IN REVIEW
II (May-June 1968).
49: Note HEW's suggested methods of implementing the freeze in the text accompanying
n.37 supra. In response to the freeze the state of Georgia submitted to HEW a plan whereby
Georgia proposed a waiting list for AFDC children who exceeded the number which would be
matched by Federal participation. HEW rejected the plan on the ground that it was inconsistent
with the statutory requirement for plan approval. Matter of the Petition of the State of Georgia for
Reconsideration of its Proposed Implementation of section 208(b) of Pub. Law 90-248 (Apr. 2,

1968).
50.
51.

Pub. L. No. 90-364, tit. Iil, § 301(3) (June 28, 1968).
392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968).
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subsequent to the instant decision have in fact acted on the basis of' a
"judicial decision," thereby increasing the number of children originally

in the base period."
The instant decision has moved the nation another step toward

uniform application of public welfare,.thus, hopefully, eradicating many
of the inequities deriving from diversity among the states. As President
Johnson said when he signed the 1968 Social Security Act amendments,
"The welfare system today pleases no one. It is criticized by liberals and
conservatives, by the poor and the wealthy, by social workers and
politicians, by whites and by Negroes in every area of the nation."" If

the Supreme Court decides any of the numerous pending suits in the field
of public welfare, more federal standards will ensue, thereby moving the

nation closer to a federalized public welfare program. HEW Secretary
Cohen has already recommended federalizing public welfare as a step
toward providing equal treatment within each class of recipients.
Whatever the specific reforms, it seems certain that the public welfare

system is headed for a drastic change.

Taxation- Corporate Income Tax-Pre-Sale Declaration of
Dividend by Subsidiary in Amount Equal to Retained Earnings
Held Tax-Exempt Inter-Corporate Dividend on Receipt by Parent
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a deficiency in

petitioner's income tax return by disallowing an exclusion claimed as a
tax-exempt inter-corporate dividend under section 243 of the Internal
Revenue Code.' The claimed exclusion resulted from the following
52. Letter from Office of Gen. Coun., Soc. & Rehab. Serv. Div., HEW, to Commr.,
Assistance Payments Admin., July 18, 1968.
53. HEW, supra note 26, at 20. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CIVIL DISORDERS 26 (Bantam ed. 1968), where the Commission reported: "Our present system of
public welfare is designed to save money instead of people, and tragically ends up doing neither."
See also Raskin, Negative Income Tax, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1968 § 4 at 4, col. I: "Public welfare is
an $8 billion business without a friend. Everyone from George Wallace to Stokely Carmichael
agrees that the programs, started on an 'emergency' basis to ease the hardships of mass
unemployment in the nineteen-thirties, have become a disaster area for relief recipients and
taxpayers alike."
the case of a corporation, there shall be allowed as a
I. Section 243 provides that "[i]n
deduction an amount equal to the following percentages of the amount received as dividends from a
INT. REV. CODE Of
...
domestic corporation. . .(3) 100%, in the case of qualifying dividends.
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transaction. After rejecting a purchase offer in the amount of the fair
market value of its wholly-owned subsidiaries, petitioner proposed a
counter offer to sell the stock for cash in an amount equal to its basis,
such sale to occur after declaration by one subsidiary of a dividend in an
amount equal to the excess over petitioner's basis. The combined total of
dividend and purchase price received by petitioner was thus equal to the
purchaser's original offering price.2 The dividend was declared and paid
by a note;' petitioner then signed the agreement consummating the sale.
The.pote representing the dividend was then paid by the purchaser, and
petitioner excluded the amount received from taxable income as a taxexempt inter-corporate dividend.4 Respondent contended that the
transaction was a mere sham to avoid captial gain taxations that in
substance no dividend was paid to petitioner, and that payment of the
note was actually a part of the purchase price. In a determination of the
issues by the Iax Court, held, for the petitioner. The distribution of
earnings by a subsidiary to a parent corporation in the form of a
dividend immediately prior to sale of the parent's stock in the subsidiary
constitutes a tax-exempt inter-corporate dividend where no purchase
agreement is signed until after the dividend has been declared and paid.
Waterman Steamship Corporation, 50.63 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM.
Disc. 448 (July 31, 1968).

Wfiere the sole purpose of a transaction is tax avoidance the court
will look behind the form to the substance of the arrangement, 6 and in
1954, § 243(b)(1). A qualifying dividend is one received from a corporation in an affiliated group,
i.e., corporations related through stock ownership in which the parent possesses at least 80% of the
voting stock of the subsidiary. Id. at §§ 243(b)(5), 1504(a). Petitioner Waterman was the sole
owner of its subsidiary's stock.
2. The original cash offer made by purchaser was for $3,500,000 and petitioner counteroffered to sell for a total price of S3,500,000, but made up of $700,000 in cash (its basis in
subsidiaries) and $2,800,000 in dividends to be paid by the subsidiary. This form of transaction was
chosen to avoid payment of capital gains tax on the $2,800,000 realized above the adjusted basis of
$700,000. In this way petitioner was able to avoid payment of any tax on the dividend.
3. A promissory note was issued because the subsidiaries did not have sufficient cash on hand
to make cash payments.
4. Purchaser assumed the liabilities of the subsidiaries, including the promissory note for
dividends owed petitioner. The cash for the transaction was obtained from a personal loan to
purchaser and immediately passed on to petitioner.
5. Purchaser desired to acquire the stock or assets of the subsidiaries only if the acquisition
could be made without the approval of the ICC. Petitioner admitted manipulating the transfer so as
to realize S3,500,000, but contended that avoidance of ICC scrutiny, rather than tax avoidance, was
his prime purpose.
6. "Although Gregory [v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)] may mean all things to all men, its
essence is an instinctive judicial attitude that a transaction should not be given effect for tax
-purposes unless it serves a purpose other than tax avoidance. Thus, a transaction heavily laden with
tax avoidance motives may be disregarded as a 'sham', or its form may be recast to reflect its
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such a case the form will be disregarded and the tax benefit denied.

However, where tax avoidance is but an incident of an otherwise valid
business purpose, the court will recognize the legitimacy of the taxpayer's

manipulation and disregard the issue of tax avoidance." Such a result is
based on the recognition of congressional power to tax that which, for
policy reasons, it had permitted to be deducted; tax avoidance, however,

does not fall within such a policy.9 Where it has been determined that tax
avoidance is not the sole aim of the taxpayer, the time at which a

dividend is declared and paid becomes a significant. Treasury Regulation
1.61-9(c) recognizes that dividends declared and paid before the sale of
stock constitute income to the seller.10 It has been held that where a
dividend is declared and paid after the stockholder has contracted to sell
the stock, but before conditions precedent to the sale have been met, the
dividend is income to the seller." There is, however, an apparent
recognition for the need of an enforceable agreement between buyer and
seller; where such an agreement is reached, the buyer becomes the
beneficial owner of the stock and is entitled to any dividends paid.':
. in order to prevent overreaching taxpayers from doing indirectly what
& J. EUSTICE. FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS 555 (2d ed. 1966).
7. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940). The Court there noted that the courts have
little use for "[t]echnical considerations, niceties of the law . . .. or legal paraphernalia which
inventive genius may construct ....
" See also Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935);
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Corp., 338 U.S. 451 (1950);
cf.Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
9. It cannot realistically be contended that Congress has provided deductions solely for
purposes of tax avoidance, for to hold otherwise "would deprive the statutory provision in question
of all serious purpose." Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465,470 (1935).
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-9(c) (1964): "When stock is sold, and a dividend is both declared and
paid after the sale, such dividend is not gross income to the seller. When stock is sold after the
declaration of a dividend and after the date as of which the seller becomes entitled to the dividend,
the dividend ordinarily is income to the seller. When stock is sold between the time of declaration
and the time of payment of the dividend, and the sale takes place at such time that the purchaser
becomes entitled to the dividend, the dividend ordinarily is income to him. The fact that the
purchaser may have included the amount of the dividend in his purchase price in contemplation of
receiving the dividend does not exempt him from tax. Nor can the purchaser deduct the added
amount he advanced to the seller in anticipation of the dividend. The added amount is merely part of
the purchase price of the stock. In some cases, however, the purchaser may be considered to be the
recipient of the dividend even though he has not received the legal title to the stock itself and does not
himself receive the dividend. For example, if the seller retains the legal title to the stock as trustee
solely for the purpose of securing the payment of the purchase price, with the understanding that he
is to apply the dividends received from time to time in reduction of the purchase price, the dividends
are considered to be income to the purchaser."
II. Joseph L. O'Brien Co., 35 T.C. 750 (1961), aJj'd,301 F.2d 813 (3d Cir. 1962); Sam E.
Wilson, Jr., 27 T.C. 976 (1957), aj]'dpercuriam, 255 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1958).
12. Steel Improvement & Forge Co. v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 96, 98 (6th Cir. 1963): "[The]
economic 'substance'

. .

they cannot do directly." B. BITTKER
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Conversely, until a binding agreement is signed, the owner has the legal,
as well as the equitable, title and the dividend is income to him.13
Payment of dividends by promissory note is sanctioned by courts, even
when it has been shown that the corporation had no intention of paying
the note.'"
The instant court held that the note paid to petitioner by its
subsidiaries prior to sale of their stock was properly deducted as a taxexempt inter-corporate dividend. While granting that "the distinction is
a shgdowy one," the court differentiated between a dividend declared
and paid subsequent to a written agreement for the sale of stock and one
declared and paid subsequent to a "general understanding" not yet
reduced to writing.'5 The court noted that in the absence of a legally
enforceable agreement the purchaser had no right to the stock; the
beneficial ownership remained in petitioner who was entitled, therefore,
to any dividend paid.' 6 To the Commissioner's argument that in
substance no dividend was paid, the court replied that the facts showed
clearly the parties' agreement that a dividend be paid to the taxpayer and
that "the substance as well as the form of the transaction was a payment
of a dividend to the taxpayer."' 7 The court held the payment of the
dividend to petitioner to be an integral part of this agreement concerning
the sale of stock; this combined with the business purpose necessitated by
compliance with ICC regulations" was held sufficient to distinguish
other cases in which no substantial business purpose, other than tax
disputed dividend is properly taxable as ordinary income to the party having beneficial ownership of
the stock at the time when the dividend is established .
See also McKinley Corp. of Ohio, 36
T.C. 1182 (1961).
13. See note 9 supra.
14. See, e.g., T.R. Miller Mills Co., 37 B.T.A. 43, aJ.'d, 102 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1939).
Although the payment of the dividend by promissory note in the instant case was not contested
50.63 P-H TC 453 n. I) it seems to be an integral part of respondent's argument that in substance
no dividend was paid.
15. Para. 50.63 P-H TC at 457.
16. Perhaps the court's distinction may be justified on the basis of the risk imposed on a seller
that a purchaser will refuse to complete the transaction once the dividend has been declared. This
would leave the seller with a dividend not wanted absent the sale, but the instant case demonstrates
that the seller can arrange the transaction to provide such assurance without a written contract. In
any event, the dividend is tax-exempt and could be plowed back into the subsidiary to increase the
parent's basis in it.
17. Para. 50.63 P-H TC at 456. This was actually the same position respondent took in Steel
Improvement & Forge Co., 36 T.C. 265 (1961) upon similar facts. The basis for reversal in Steel
Improvement & Forge Co. v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 96 (6th Cir.- 1963) was not that in substance
or form there was no dividend paid, but rather that the taxpayer was not the beneficial owner at the
time the dividend was declared and paid. In that case the dividend was declared subsequent to a
"written agreement. The Tax Court's decision as to substance and form thus remains as precedent.
18. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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avoidance, was involved.' 9 The court recognized the right of taxpayers
to reduce or eliminate taxable income in the course of business
transactions where alternative courses of action yielded differing tax
consequences. 0 On the facts of the case, petitioner had several
alternative methods of selling the stock in which little or no taxable
income would result; however, the method used was the only one
acceptable for the purchaser's business purposes.2 Since this tax-free
treatment of an inter-corporate dividend is permitted by the Code, the
court allowed petitioner to arrange its affairs so as to obtain the
sactioned tax benefit. In dissent, three judges felt that the majority failed
to face the question of whether a dividend was paid at all.2" Citing
Gregory v. Helvering, they concluded that the note issued by the
subsidiary "served only a temporary purpose and disappeared," 23
making the whole transaction a hollow form for the avoidance of
24
taxation .
Employing the method sanctioned by the instant court, a
corporation could benefit substantially whenever it is able to sell a
subsidiary's stock, so long as the subsidiary has accumulated earnings
and profits. While the result reached does not conflict with congressional
policy as expressed in the consolidated return provisions of section 243
of the Code, -5 it seems contrary to that expressed in the near penal
accumulated earnings tax provisions of section 53 1.26
Thus, while
19. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) and cases cited note I I supra.
20. Para. 50.63 P-H TC at 457: "Where the transaction is carried out in a recognized form to
accomplish its purpose and is not a sham or subterfuge, its substance should not be considered to
differ from its form merely because the same result might have been accomplished by the parties by
another method which would have produced a higher tax."
21. Id. at 454: "Petitioner points out that except for the fact that Pan-Atlantic and Gulf
Florida each had an ICC certificate which could not be directly transferred without approval by the
ICC, Pan-Atlantic could have declared a dividend in kind to Waterman and thereafter Waterman
could have sold its assets. . ., or. . .could have directly sold its assets . . ., or could have merged
with Waterman and the assets which had previously belonged to Pan-Atlantic could have been
sold. . . . Petitioner states that since Pan-Atlantic's basis in its assets exceeded $3,500,000 no
taxable income would have resulted from a sale. . . under any one of these arrangements."
22. Id. at 458.
23. In Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), the taxpayer created a corporation for the
sole purpose of receiving a transfer of stock. After the transfer the corporation was immediately
liquidated and its proceeds distributed tax-free to the stockholder under § 332. The Court
disallowed the claimed tax benefit.
24. When the transaction was complete, the subsidiaries were neither richer nor poorer than
before. Para. 50.63 P-H TC at 459.
25. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 243 aims toward the simplification of parent-subsidiary tax
returns. In return for the tax-exempt inter-corporate dividends of § 243(a)(3), Congress requires the
affiliated group to be treated as one taxpayer. The result reached here is not in conflict with this
policy.
26. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 531 provides that a tax will be imposed upon the accumulated
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Congress frowns on the accumulation of earnings, the present decision
favors it when the sale of stock is contemplated. 27 The dissent expressed
the view that there was no substance to the dividend, 28 and this is
substantiated by the fact that thie "dividend" would not have been paid
but for the contemplated sale. In this respect it resembles the "corporate
reorganization" disallowed in Gregory v. Helvering. Although the court
stated that payment by promissory note is permitted, 9 it remains a
disturbing feature of the case,3" since the corporate liability was
subtracted from the purchase price and passed on to be paid by the
purchaser. Since the note was paid by a personal loan secured by the
purchaser (and not by the subsidiary), it appears that the subsidiary was
used as a mere conduit for the payment of a portion of the purchase
price. In view of the congressional policy favoring small accumulated
earnings, payment by note is perhaps justifiable and necessary. While the
question is momentarily settled, it would seem that a parent corporation
should not be permitted to reduce its tax bill on the sale of stock in a
wholly-owned subsidiary by means of a dividend declared only because
of the sa.le and with no purpose other than tax avoidance.
The uniqueness of result reached in the instant case, due to the great
disparity between the subsidiary's fair market value ($3,500,000) and the
taxpayer's basis ($700,000), points to a more pressing issue; for had the
dividend declared by the subsidiary been sufficiently large to overlap the
basis, thereby enabling the taxpayer to claim a loss, the Commissioner
may have had a stronger argument. Following this reasoning, had the
taxpayer purchased the subsidiary at its fair market value and then
received the dividend, the subsequent sale would have had the effect of
skimming off the retained earnings and then claiming a loss. It is
submitted that the taxpayer should not be permitted to claim a loss
earnings of a corporation. The 38 2% rate imposed on accumulated taxable income in excess of

$100,000 is substantially greater than the 25% rate imposed on capital gains, thus indicating a
strong congressional policy against such accumulation. Sections 532 and 535 indicate that the
proper method of handling income is distribution to stockholders; the policy of section 531 is that of
strengthening the economy by reinvestment of income.
27. Perhaps this would constitute no more than a trap for the unwary where wholly-owned
subsidiaries are involved; however, by declaring a yearly inter-corporate dividend payable by note
(which in turn is plowed back into the subsidiary, thereby increasing the parent's basis) the
corporation may escape the accumulated earnings tax. When sale of the subsidiary's assets occurs,
the parent will be taxable only on the capital gain realized if its basis has appreciated in value.
28. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
29. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., John R. vest, 37 T.C. 684 (1962). Petitioner sold a corporation with
outstanding claims against the government carried on its books as assets. Purchaser refused, to
purchase the claims and the asset was subtracted from the market value of the corporation and
assigned to the petitioner. Petitioner claimed that the payment was part of the purchase price. The
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sustained in such a transaction?' On the other hand, where, as in the
instant case, the taxpayer is the organizer of a subsidiary which, after a
contribution of $700,000 in capital, earns $2,800,000 after taxes, no
more than the earnings may be stripped off without reducing the
taxpayer's basis in the subsidiary. 2 It is thus possible for the taxpayer to
equalize the value of the stock and assets by means of a dividend. The
result in the latter hypothetical would not be unacceptable, since the
taxpayer and its subsidiaries may be treated as an economic unit under
section 243. Since the taxpayer could have corrected the disparity in
basis and value by regular dividend payments which were then reinvested
in the subsidiary, it seems unfair to say that it may not accomplish the
same result by a single dividend and subsequent sale of stock. On the
other hand, a corporation should not be permitted to reap a tax benefit
by presale stripping of apurchasedsubsidiary with a resulting loss on the
sale. In order to uphold the instant decision and at the same time prevent
the hypothetical loss cited, legislation should necessarily distinguish the
two possibilities, analogously to the policy of section 382, -1 and require
non-recognition of loss in the latter case.

claim was denied on the ground that the payment was made to the corporation and then passed on
through the conduit to petitioner.
31. For example, had the taxpayer purchased the subsidiary for $3,500,000, which included
$2,800,000 in retained earnings, caused the subsidiary to declare the sanctioned dividend, and sold
subsidiary for $700,000, it could conceivably claim a $2,800,000 loss.
32. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 301.
33. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 382 limits net operating loss carryovers in purchased
subsidiaries.

